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Introduction
It is a common conjuncture that the right to claim damages as a result of a breach of contract
plays the most pivotal role among the remedies available to an aggrieved party.1 Hence, the
importance of taking a better look at damages that can be recovered for a particular type of loss.
In this  essay an attempt is  made to identify some of the problems that arise before the courts
when granting damages for buyer’s lost resale profit under the UN Convention on the
Contracts for the International Sale of Goods.2 The practice in the area seems to be far from
clear or consistent and academic literature is not always lending a helping hand.
The purpose of the first part of the essay is to sketch the notion of lost resale profit against a
broader background of the law of damages. Further and more detailed analysis will oscillate
around three issues which in practice appear to be central to the recoverability of the lost resale
profit by the buyer, namely the foreseeability, calculation and mitigation of that loss. It is
fascinating to see how the concrete and abstract considerations, general principles and their
detailed applications are all masterfully interwoven in the colourful fabric of the lost resale
profit issue. The author hopes to shed some light on the various patterns embellishing this fine
material and, if possible single out the most prominent strands.
1. Loss of resale profit as a type of loss recoverable under Art. 74 CISG
Before embarking on the more concrete analysis, it is important to bear in mind some basic
propositions relating to the issue of damages under CISG.
Pursuant to Art. 45(1)(b) CISG, if the seller fails to perform any of his obligations that he has
under the contract or the Convention, the buyer may claim damages as provided under Arts.
74-77  CISG.  It  is  irrelevant  whether  the  obligations  that  the  seller  failed  to  perform  are
principal or ancillary.3 Thus the seller’s liability may be triggered not only by his failure to
deliver goods (Arts. 30 and 31 CISG) but also by delivery of goods which do not conform to the
contract (Art. 35 CISG).
1 S.  Eiselen,  Measuring  damages  for  the  breach  of  contract:  Remarks  on  the  manner  in  which  UNIDROIT
Principles on International Commercial Contracts mat be used to interpret or supplement Article 74 of the CISG,
in: An International Approach to the Interpretation of the United Nations Convention on the Contracts for the
International Sale of Goods (1908) as Uniform Sales Law, ed. J. Felemegas, CUP 2007, at 211.
2 Hereinafter referred to as the Convention or CISG.
3 M. Müller-Chen, in P. Schlechtriem/I. Schwenzer, Commentary on the UN Convention on the International
Sale of Goods (CISG), Oxford 2005, Art. 45, p. 520.
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The seller’s liability for performance of his obligations is objective, independent of fault or
specific warranty of performance.4 He assumes that liability the moment he undertakes an
obligation to perform under a contract governed by CISG.
The recoverability of damages under the Convention is determined by the following principles.
First, the  purpose  of  remedies  of  breach  of  contract  is  to  provide  relief  to  the  aggrieved  party
rather than provide a mechanism to prevent the breach.5 Therefore,  for  the  buyer  to  recover
damages there must be a failure on the part of the seller to perform any of his obligations under
the contract or the Convention6 and no exemption available under Art. 79 or Art. 80 CISG.7
In other words, damages are compensatory, not punitive, in nature.8
Second,  relief  to  the  aggrieved  party  is  to  be  measured  by  that  party’s  loss  of  “expectation
interests”, also known as “the benefit of the bargain”.9 Damages  aim  to  put  the  party  who
suffered loss in the position which he would have enjoyed had the contract been performed10
although not in any better one.11 This is often said to be the principle of full compensation.12 It
means that all types of losses are relevant under CISG.13 As P. Huber pointed out, whilst
various classifications of losses may turn out to be helpful in identifying types of loss that can be
suffered,  by  no  means  should  they  serve  as  criteria  of  recoverability  of  loss  under  CISG.  The
basic  philosophy  of  damages  is,  as  stipulated  in  the  Secretariat  Commentary,  to  place  the
injured party “in the same economic position he would have been in if the contract had been
performed”.14
4 M. Müller-Chen, in P. Schlechtriem/I. Schwenzer, Commentary on the UN Convention on the International
Sale of Goods (CISG), Oxford 2005, Art. 45, p. 528.
5 E. A. Farnsworth, Remedies and Specific, 27 American Journal of Comparative Law 1979, at 247.
6 See Art. 45(1)(b) CISG.
7 P. Huber, in: Huber/Mullis, The CISG. A new textbook for students and practitioners, Sellier 2007, at 257.
8 G. H. Treitel, Remedies for Breach of Contract, p. 76; P. Huber, in: Huber/Mullis, The CISG. A new textbook
for  students  and  practitioners,  Sellier  2007,  p.  268;  CISG  Advisory  Council  Opinion  No  6,  Calculation  of
Damages under CISG, Article 74, para. 9.5.
9 E. A. Farnsworth, Remedies and Specific Relief, 27 American Journal of Comparative Law 1979, at 247; G. H.
Treitel, Remedies for Breach of Contract, at 82. German law refers to this interest as Erfüllungsinteresse or
positive interest, as opposed to Vertrauensinteresse, i.e., negative interest, which is protected by compensating
expenses and other losses incurred in reliance on the contract.  The latter aims to put the aggrieved party in the
position in which he would have been had the contract never been made. (Treitel, ibidem, p. 83).
10 Stoll, Gruber, in: Schlechtriem/Schwenzer, Commentary on the UN Convention on the International Sale of
Goods, Art. 74 (...); see also commentary to an earlier version of the Convention, A/CN.9/116, Annex II, available at
<http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/yearbooks/yb-1976-e/vol7-p96-142-e.pdf> and the Sectretariat Commentary
on the 1978 Draft, at <http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cisg/text/secomm/secomm-74.html>.
11 CISG Advisory Council Opinion No 6, Calculation of Damages under CISG, Article 74, para. 9. Cf. P. Huber,
in: P. Huber, A. Mullis, The CISG. A new textbook for students and practitioners, Sellier 2007, at 256 (although
the statement has been made with regard to availability of various remedies, it remains valid for the present
purposes): “... damages are not available where their award would lead to the buyer being overcompensated.”
12 CISG Advisory Council Opinion No 6, Calculation of Damages under CISG, Article 74, para. 1.1.
13 P. Huber, in: P. Huber, A. Mullis, The CISG. A new textbook for students and practitioners, Sellier 2007, p. 268.
14 Commentary  on  the  Draft  Convention  on  Contracts  for  International  Sale  of  Goods  prepared  by  the
Secretariat, Doc A/CONF.97/5, Art. 29, No. 5 – United Nations Conference on Contracts for the International
Sale of Goods, Official Records, New York, 1981 (A/CONF.97/19), 53. J. Honnold, Uniform Law For
International Sales under the 1980 United Nations Convention, 3rd ed., Kluwer Law International 1999,
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Third, only loss suffered as a consequence of the breach of contract will be compensable. It
appears that the test applicable to determine causation is the conditio sine qua non or the “but
for” test.15 In  order  to  avoid  the  so-called  “Adam  and  Eve”  causation  trap,  where  everything
would ultimately have the cause in the beginnings of the Universe, a mechanism of limitation
of  damages  needs  to  be  in  place.  One  of  the  mechanisms  instated  in  the  Convention  is  the
foreseeability test,16 which constitutes the next proposition.
Fourth, losses recoverable under Art. 74 CISG have been confined only to those that “the party
in breach foresaw or ought to have foreseen at the time of the conclusion of the contract, in the
light  of  the  facts  and  matters  of  which  he  then  knew  or  ought  to  have  known,  as  a  possible
consequence of the breach of contract”.17
Fifth, damages should not include compensation for loss that might reasonably have been
avoided.18 The requirement of avoidability has been expressed in Art. 77 CISG, according to
which a party relying on a breach of contract must take such measures as are reasonable in the
circumstances to mitigate the loss, including loss of profit, resulting from the breach.
As follows from the principle of full compensation and Art. 74 CISG, the aggrieved party can
claim damages for any loss that the party suffered, including loss of profit.19
Whilst the actual loss has been defined as the reduction in the assets which existed when the
contract  was  concluded,  loss  of  profit  is  taken  to  mean  any  increase  in  the  assets  which  the
breach prevented.20 A cursory definition of profits referenced to in Art. 74 CISG was laid down
in the Compound fertilizer case of 30 January 1996.21 Anticipated profits were taken to mean net
profits, i.e., anticipated gross profits less payable fees.
A loss of resale profit is one possible type of lost profit situation and as such is fully
compensable under Art.  74 CISG, though clearly it  may not lead to the overcompensation of
the buyer. If the seller has not delivered at all or the delivered goods (or part of them) are non-
conforming, the buyer is left unable to gain profit from the resale of the goods. If, however, he
manages to mitigate the loss and resell the goods albeit for a lower price, he should only be able
to recover the price difference between the two contracts as his lost resale profit.
As F. Enderlein and D. Maskow state: "As to the loss of profit, there are several possibilities. It
may be questioned whether the injured party is entitled to recover the loss of profit he actually
15 Stoll/Gruber, in: P. Schlechtriem/I. Schwenzer, Commentary on the UN Convention on the International Sale
of Goods, Art. 74, para. 23; P. Huber, in: P. Huber, A. Mullis, The CISG. A new textbook for students and
practitioners, Sellier 2007, p. 270.
16 D. Saidov, Methods of Limiting Damages under the Vienna Convention on Contracts for the International Sale
of Goods, <http://cisg3.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/saidov.html>.
17 For a more detailed analysis see below (“Foreseeability”).
18 E. A. Farnsworth, Remedies and Specific Relief, 27 American Journal of Comparative Law 1979, at 247.
19 Art. 74 CISG: “Damages for breach of contract by one party consist of a sum equal to the loss, including loss of
profit, suffered by the other party as a consequence of the breach.”
20 Stoll/Gruber, in P. Schlechtriem/I. Schwenzer, Commentary on the UN Convention on the International Sale
of Goods (CISG), Oxford 2005, Art. 74, para. 22, p. 758.
21 China International Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission (CIETAC) proceeding of 30 January
(Compound fertilizer case), 1996 <http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/960130c1.html>.
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suffered, the exact profit he could have expected, or an average profit to be expected at a certain
time  in  a  certain  place.  It  is  unclear  also  for  which  period  of  time  the  loss  of  profit  can  be
measured."22
In  deciding  whether  the  profit  would  have  been  made  if  the  contract  had  been  properly
performed, the Convention does not stipulate what degree of probability is necessary. It is
generally submitted that the aggrieved buyer should prove the loss with reasonable certainty.23
2. Foreseeability
As mentioned above,  losses are only recoverable if  they have been foreseeable by the party in
breach of the contract. Foreseeability is a troublesome concept to define. It also appears to be
the key principle applied by the courts when determining whether lost resale profit should be
recoverable.
The main issue considered by courts in determining sellers’ liability was whether the seller
could foresee or ought to have foreseen the loss of buyer’s profit. This, however, begs further
question: what is the standard of foreseeability applied in the case of lost resale profit?
The wording of Art. 74 CISG24 clearly suggests that the loss resulting from the breach of
contract does not need to be actually foreseen.25 The breaching party may be held liable if the
loss is foreseeable. It seems that the foreseeability of buyer’s lost resale profit has been
ascertained in the jurisprudence by adopting one of the two different, if not contradictory,
approaches. The courts have either required that the seller have the knowledge of the buyer’s
resale contract, typically already upon the conclusion of the contract of sale, or it has been
assumed that the seller should know that the buyer was to resell the goods.
The first approach is illustrated in the India rapeseed case.26 It was held that the seller should not
be  liable  for  the  loss  of  resale  profit  since  the  resale  contracts  (entered  into  on  27  August
2002) were signed after the conclusion of the contract between the buyer and the seller (dated
30 July 2002). Therefore, the seller was unaware of the conclusion and the terms of the resale
contract. The Arbitration Tribunal did not find sufficient evidence showing that the seller
foresaw  or  ought  to  have  foreseen  the  difference  between  the  contract  price  and  the  resale
price alleged by the buyer in the light of the facts which the seller then knew or ought to have
22 Fritz Enderlein & Dietrich Maskow. "International Sales Law", Oceana (1992), p. 299.
23 CISG Advisory Council Opinion No 6, Calculation of Damages under CISG, Article 74, para. 2; P. Huber, in:
Huber/Mullis, The CISG. A new textbook for students and practitioners, Sellier 2007, p. 276; cf “the competent
judge  should  be  convinced that  the  profit  would  actually  have  been made ...  before  relief  for  this  type  of  loss  is
granted”, Neumayer/Ming, Art. 74, note 1; Weber, Vertragsverletzungsfolgen, p. 196, cited from Stoll/Gruber, in
P. Schlechtriem/I. Schwenzer, Commentary on the UN Convention on the International Sale of Goods (CISG),
Oxford 2005, Art. 74, p. 759.
24 “...the loss which the party in breach ... ought to have foreseen”.
25 J. Lookofsky, The 1980 United Nations Convention on Contracts ?for the International Sale of Goods, Article
74, Damages for Breach, in: J. Herbots editor / R. Blanpain general editor, International Encyclopaedia of Laws -
Contracts,  Suppl.  29  (December  2000),  at  290,  footnote  3,  also  available  at
<http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/loo74.html>.
26 CIETAC  China  Arbitration  proceeding  of  29  September  2004  (India  rapeseed  case),
<cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/040929c1.html>.
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known, as a possible consequence of the breach of contract. Similarly, in the Tinplate case, it
has been required that the buyer should inform the seller of a resale contract.27
The prerequisite of the seller’s knowledge raises some doubts when it comes to lost resale profit
cases. In commercial practice the buyer and the seller are usually identifiable entities entering
into transactions with known purposes. Incidentally, if the buyer, being a shoe wholesaler,
orders hundreds of pairs of shoes it is not unforeseeable that the goods would be resold. If then
the seller does not deliver or delivers non-conforming goods, it seems evident that the buyer will
suffer loss of profit that he could earn by resale. In addition, resale is one of the usual ways of
dealing with goods and as such will usually be foreseeable.28
The relevance of commercial practice seems to have been taken into account by the Austrian
Supreme Court in a case involving a sale (and resale) of propane gas.29 In this case the German
buyer and the Austrian seller entered into an agreement for the delivery of 3000 mt of propane
gas. On the same day the buyer resold the ordered quantity of gas to the Dutch company onto
the Belgium market. The seller however did not obtain from his supplier a permission required
for reselling the gas in Benelux countries, as a result of which he did not deliver the gas to the
buyer. The buyer let the sellers know that his customer already had made substitute purchases
and that he was trying to sell the quantity already purchased in Germany. On the same day,
the  sellers  also  told  the  buyer  that  the  natural  gas  could  not  be  sold  to  customers  in  the  so-
called Benelux countries at all. The Austrian buyer instituted proceedings against the seller
claiming  lost  profit  from  the  envisaged  resale  of  the  natural  gas  in  Belgium.  The  buyer
claimed he suffered a loss of profit of $5 per ton, resulting in the total of $15,000. Although
the seller was generally considered to be liable for loss of profit only if he had to reckon with
the buyer’s resale, it was held that “in case of the sale of commercial goods to a merchant, this
can always be assumed without any further indications.”
The approach taken by the Austrian Supreme Court in this case appears to be in line with a
previous decision delivered by the Chinese Arbitration Tribunal in the Art paper case of 12
February 1996.30 The Tribunal held that since the buyer is a trading company, the seller
“should  have  known  that  the  buyer  was  not  buying  goods  for  his  own  use”  but  in  order  to
resell them.
In the judgment of 23 December 2004,31 a  Russian  tribunal  held  that  “the  [Seller],  as  a
professional participant of the market (...), could not have been unaware of the fact that the
[Buyer] is not the consumer of the delivered goods and that it distributes them on the internal
market of Russia, that naturally includes transshipment (resale) of the purchased goods by the
[Buyer] to further customers.” The tribunal took into account not only the status of the seller
but also the long-lasting business relations the parties were in, which additionally were
reflected in a number of contracts concluded between them.
27 CIETAC China Arbitration proceeding of 17 October 1996 (Tinplate case),
<http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/961017c1.html>.
28 P. Huber, in P. Huber/A. Mullis, The CISG. A new textbook for students and practitioners, Sellier, 2007, p. 273.
29 Austria 6 February 1996 Supreme Court (Propane case), <http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/960206a3.html>.
30 CIETAC China Arbitration proceeding of 12 February 1996 (Art paper case),
<http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/960212c1.html>.
31 Russia 23 December 2004 Arbitration proceeding 97/2004, http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/041223r1.html.
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Considering the above-cited case law, it seems that the test applied to ascertain foreseeability of
lost resale profit is often an objective one, i.e., it does not refer to what the seller actually
foresaw. On the other hand, however, there is no reference to the reasonable person standard
either. Foreseeability of lost resale profit seems to have been based on factors such as the nature
of the goods involved (“commercial goods”) and the status of the buyer (“a trading company”,
“not  the  consumer  of  the  delivered  goods”).  It  also  means  that  the  requirement  of  the  loss
being foreseeable at the time of the conclusion of the contract will normally be fulfilled.
The standard of foreseeability under CISG remains however both subjective and objective. As
early as in s 1979 ULIS case,32 the  Federal  Supreme  Court  of  Germany  (Bundesgerichtshof)
concluded that “... ULIS Article 82 [a match-up article with Article 74 CISG] 33 requires (...)
that the test can conclusively be met by a showing of trade custom as to foreseeability, and
that a survey of persons in the trade is a proper means of determining those facts”.34 In that
case, a German cheese importer was reselling cheese to other customers concluded a contract
with a Dutch exporter. It turned out that 3% of the total delivery of the cheese was defective.
The  buyer  sought  damages  for  loss  of  profits  alleging  that  four  of  his  wholesale  customers
ceased doing business with him, which resulted in lost profits over four years. Having taken
into account the information from chambers of commerce and industry concerning the
question of foreseeability, the court held that it was foreseeable that minor deficiencies in
performance could lead to a loss of customers.
The decision has been criticized for treating foreseeability in the factual context rather than as
an element in the assessment of the degree of the seller's  risk assumption at  the time of the
conclusion of the contract.35 Commenting on the decision, P. Schlechtriem noted that
“Liability with regard to customers (indemnification), however, should at least have been
'foreseeable' within the normative meaning of this criterion since it is to be expected in the
usual course of delivery of defective goods to a middleman. These types of damages are
('quite simply') considered 'foreseeable' not only for goods delivered to a middleman for
resale but also for products for further processing, whose defects create replacement
obligations for the buyer/manufacturer with respect to its customers.”
32 BGH of 24 October 1979, RIW 1980, 143 et seq., <http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/791024g1.html>.
33 It has been established on various occasions that ULIS jurisprudence can be useful in interpreting the
Convention, see F.A. Mann, Uniform Statutes in English Law, 99 Law Quarterly Review, 1983, p. 382; B. Audit,
the Vienna Sales Convention and the Lex Mercatoria, in: Thomas E. Carbonneau ed., Lex Mercatoria and
Arbitration, Juris Publishing 1998, p. 188.
34 Cf.  Eric  C.  Schneider,  Measuring  Damages  under  CISG,  <http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cisg/text/cross/cross-
74.html>, citing Jeffrey S. Sutton, Measuring Damages Under the United Nations Convention on the
International Sale of Goods, 50 Ohio St. L.J. 743-744: “Article 74 contains both an objective and subjective test,
limiting  damages  to  the  "loss  which  the  party  in  breach  foresaw  or  ought  to  have  foreseen  at  the  time  of  the
conclusion of the contract, in light of the facts and matters of which he then knew or ought to have known."
35 See Weitnauer, Nichtvoraussehbarkeit eines Schadens nach Art. 82 S. 1 des Einheitlichen Gesetzes über den
internationalen Kauf beweglicher Sachen. Comment to BGH of 24 October 1979, IPRax 1981, 83, 84 sub IV. 1,
cited after P. Schlechtriem.
Nordic Journal of Commercial Law issue 2007 #2
7
This view seems to be supported in the Art paper case36 where it was held that since the buyer
was a trading company, the seller should have known that the buyer was not buying goods for
its own use.
3. Calculation of lost resale profit
There are two possible ways of calculating damages in a situation when a buyer lost his resale
profit:37
a) Calculating loss of profit as a price difference between the contract price and the
price for reselling to the buyer’s customer
b) Calculating loss of profit based on the difference between market price and the
contract price.
The first method seems to have been applied in a majority of cases. One of the first cases
where lost resale profit was successfully claimed by the buyer was the Art paper case of 12
February 1996.38 The tribunal awarded damages for the buyer’s loss of profit calculated as the
difference between the contract price and the price the buyer would be paid pursuant to the
resale contract. It is not clear, however, whether the buyer had already concluded the resale
contracts with its customers.
In the German paperboard containers case,39 the buyer running a business for office
organization systems concluded an annual framework contract for delivery of seller’s
“archive-solid-boards”. In December 2002, the buyer refused to sign a follow-up contract
proposed by the seller. Seller declared immediate termination of the 1999 contract because of
the alleged “systematic breaches of payment terms” by the buyer. The Appellate Court in
Köln found that the seller’s termination of the contract was unjustified. Since throughout 2003
the buyer did not receive any deliveries from the seller, the buyer was unable to realize profits
through resale of goods. The calculation of lost profits was based on the turnover expectation
(of EUR 115,000) which was actually stated by the seller itself in his letter in December 2002.
The court found that the buyer properly assumed the profit margin of 30% and took into
account cost savings of 10%. The margin of profit was proved by having submitted a
comparison of purchase and resale prices.
The seller was barred from successfully pleading ignorance as a means of challenging the
buyer's margin of profit by stating that the seller had relied on a lower margin during
contractual  negotiations.  The  seller  did  not  manage  to  specify  which  margin  of  profit  had
been proposed back and, in any case, his negotiation on the basis of too low figures appears to
have been simply a tactic move.
36 CIETAC China Arbitration proceeding of 12 February 1996 (Art paper case),
<http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu.cases/960212c1.html>.
37 CIETAC China Arbitration proceeding of 29 September 2004 (India rapeseed meal case),
<http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/040929c1.html>.
38 CIETAC China Arbitration proceeding of 12 February 1996 (Art paper case),
<http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/960212c1.html>.
39 Germany 12 January 2007 Appellate Court Köln (Paperboard containers case),
<http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/070112g1.html>.
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In the already cited Compound fertilizer case,40 the seller argued that the buyer’s resale price
was too high and the profit was exorbitant. Although in this case the seller failed to provide
sufficient evidence, it would, arguably, be against the principle of full compensation if the
buyer could recover excessive profits under the Convention.41
The second method of calculating lost resale profit was employed in a case of 27 May 2005
between a Turkish buyer and a Russian seller.42 The seller failed to deliver a prepaid
installment of goods to the buyer, who sued the former for loss of profits. In granting the
buyer this claim, the Russian tribunal took into account the rate of profit existent on the
Turkish market, which could be gained from the resale of the goods. The market rate was
evidenced  by  the  buyer  in  a  document.  It  was  held  that  the  seller  “could  not  have  failed  to
foresee the occurrence of this loss of the [Buyer] in base of non-performance by the [Seller]
of its contractual obligations”.
Similarly, a Ukrainian tribunal43 refused to accept buyer’s calculation of the lost profit on the
basis of subtracting the contract price of the goods from the sum the buyer claimed it could
have received as payment for the processed product. Instead, the buyer was awarded a much
smaller sum (US $897,000 instead of the initially claimed US $1,700,000) calculated on the
basis of the difference between the market and contractual price.
Although it  may  not  always  be  clear  from the  jurisprudence,  it  seems  that  calculation  of  lost
resale profit can only be based on the difference between the resale contract price and the
contract price when the buyer had concluded resale contracts. If there are no such resale
contracts, even if the buyer regularly resells the goods to its customers, the loss should be
calculated on the basis of market price.
4. Mitigation of loss of resale profit by the buyer
Article 77 CISG imposes an obligation upon the buyer to mitigate his loss of profit. If he fails
to do so, the party in breach may claim a reduction of the amount of the damages.44 The
principle underpinning the mitigation of loss is that the aggrieved party should not recover
damages for loss that could reasonably have been avoided.45 It has been said to be the
expression of good faith in international commerce.46
Pursuant to Art. 77 CISG, the aggrieved party is required to take measures that are reasonable
in the circumstances, i.e., measures that under the circumstances of the individual case could
40 CIETAC China Arbitration proceeding of 30 January 1996 (Compound fertilizer case),
<http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/960130c1.html>.
41 See also P. Huber, in Huber/Mullis, The CISG..., p. 276.
42 Russia 27 May 2005 Arbitration proceeding, <http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/050527r1.html>.
43 Ukraine 2005 Arbitration proceeding, Case no. 48, <http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/050000u5.html>.
44 P. Huber, in P. Huber/A. Mullis, The CISG. A new textbook for students and practitioners, p. 289.
45 G. Treitel, Remedies for Breach of Contract: A Comparative Account, 1988, p. 179; Knapp/Bianca, Bonell, pp.
559-560; Stoll/Gruber, in: Schlechtriem, Commentary on the UN Convention on the International Sale of
Goods, p. 787.
46 Stoll/Gruber,  in:  Schlechtriem,  Commentary  on the  UN Convention on the  International  Sale  of  Goods,  p.
787 and literature cited there.
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have been expected in good faith.47 In one court’s view, the answer to the question of which
measures would be reasonable and ought to be taken depends on how a reasonable creditor
would have acted in the same situation.48
Since the claim of the breach of the duty to mitigate damages is an exception leading to the
loss  of  the  claim for  damages,  it  is  the  seller  who needs  to  prove  it.  In  the  situation  of  lost
resale profit, the seller will typically try to raise the argument that the buyer failed to conclude
substitute contracts at an appropriate time and in an appropriate time framework according to
Art. 75 CISG.49 On the other hand, the buyer will counterclaim that he has taken reasonable
measures to mitigate loss. Repeated requests addressed to the seller to deliver the goods were
found to be insufficient means to mitigate loss.50
Analyzing the jurisprudence, it seems that the courts do not take the duty of the buyer to
mitigate his loss seriously enough. It is often held that the buyer has a duty to take reasonable
measures to mitigate his loss but rarely did the courts find the buyer falling short of this
requirement. In the case of loss of resale profit it seems that the buyer will often be able to
conclude substitute transactions to obtain the goods from elsewhere. Whether in practice
substitution  will  actually  be  feasible  is  an  entirely  different  matter  and  depends  on  the
circumstances of the individual case. It seems, however, that the courts did not give it
sufficient  thought  and  failed  to  consider  whether  mitigation  of  the  buyer’s  lost  resale  profit
could have been mitigated in that way.
In the India rapeseed meal case, for instance, the seller argued that the buyer could purchase
domestic goods to substitute the goods in resale contract. The Arbitration Tribunal found,
however, that “the seller’s allegations of purchasing substitute goods is not in accordance with
the Contract and lacks of sufficient reasons.” The decision in this respect is controversial. The
duty of the buyer to mitigate his loss of resale profit by entering into substitute transactions
should not be dependent on whether such an obligation has been stipulated in the contract
itself. It is contained expressly in Art. 77 CISG.
5. Conclusion
The analysis of the jurisprudence in the area of loss of resale profit by the buyer seems to
contain a number of inconsistencies and controversies. In awarding damages for lost resale
profit the courts have mainly focused on the issue of foreseeability, leaving the duty of the buyer
to mitigate his loss almost on the side.
Whilst circumstances surrounding the conclusion of the contract, notably the knowledge of
seller of buyer’s resale contracts, are of decisive relevance,51 it  appears  to  be  impossible  to
47 Austria 6 February 1996 Supreme Court (Propane case), <http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/960206a3.html>; cf.
von Caemmerer/Schlechtriem, Art. 77 n. 9).
48 Austria 6 February 1996 Supreme Court (Propane case), <http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/960206a3.html>.
49 Austria 6 February 1996 Supreme Court (Propane case), <http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/960206a3.html>; cf.
Ukrainian Arbitration tribunal, which held that what would be regarded as a sufficient means of mitigation would
be the purchase of analogous goods with price information presented by buyer (Case no. 48).
50 Ukraine 2005 Arbitration proceeding, Case no. 48, <http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/050000u5.html>.
51 Piltz, Internationales Kaufrecht, 1993, Munich, p. 291.
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establish a general rule that certain damages are only foreseeable if they have been expressly
dealt with in the contractual negotiations52 or made known to the breaching party.
In awarding damages for the loss of resale profit the courts should take account of the specific
nature of that loss, in particular the commercial practice in which the buyer and the seller
operate.
52 Switzerland 28 October 1998 Supreme Court (Meat case), <http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases.981028s1.html>.
